This paper studies the interaction between capital income taxation and a means tested age pension in the context of an overlapping generations model, calibrated to the UK economy. Recent literature has suggested a rehabilitation of capital income taxation predicated on the idea that a capital income tax may be a partial substitute for the optimal age-based taxes when they are infeasible. This leads naturally to the conjecture that a publicly funded age pension contingent upon holdings of capital or capital income may have a similar e¤ect. We formalize this using a stochastic OLG model with multiple individuals di¤erentiated by labour productivity and pension entitlements. Our results document that the existence of a social insurance program …nanced from general revenue puts an upward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate. We also show that there is a negative relation between taper (bene…t-reduction) and optimal capital income tax rates. The potential welfare gain from optimizing capital taxation in the presence of a universal retirement transfer system is relatively higher. However, when the transfer is substantially means tested, the gain is lower, because the means test e¤ectively operates as a tax on retirement capital.
Introduction
Over the last decade or so, the 1980s results of Judd and Chamley (Judd (1985) & Chamley (1986) ) that a zero capital income tax rate is optimal, have been severely quali…ed. There are two major explanations. The …rst relates to restrictions on instruments. When consumer preference is placed in a life-cycle framework, individuals vary their optimal consumptionwork plan over the cycle, and age speci…c taxation is not available, capital income taxation may be a second best solution. 1 Secondly, if markets are incomplete, resulting in liquidity constraints and/or uninsurable idiosyncratic income risk, then a non-zero capital income tax may dominate a zero capital tax environment, because higher net-of-tax labour earnings relax liquidity constraints and/or provide more opportunity for self-insurance. Conesa et al. (2009) show that when these features of preferences, policy restrictions and markets are represented in overlapping generations (OLG) models of incomplete economies, then the optimal capital income tax rate may be non-zero. They calculate an optimal rate of 36% for the US.
Taking the above observation as a point of departure, this paper studies the impact of means-testing (resource-testing) public pensions, a feasible policy action equivalent to introducing a capital income tax on retirement capital. The UK is one of a number of countries with a means tested pension program: the means-tested social insurance program provides an old age pension income subject to a means testing of income and asset holdings. Over the last several years various reforms have been enacted to the UK means tested pension. It is therefore suitable for our analytic purposes.
This paper contributes to the literature from two perspectives: First, it extends Conesa et al. (2009) by adding a means-tested pension program that interacts with the capital income tax rate. Since our main aim is to analyze the interaction between means-tested pension programs and taxes on capital income, we intentionally kept our benchmark model similar to that of Conesa et al. (2009) . 2 Yet, we chose to calibrate our model to the UK economy since the UK has already a means-tested pension program. As a result, we were able to assign real values to the pension program parameters. This allows us to determine the e¤ect of an implicit tax on capital income on the optimal capital income tax rate. Second, it carries Sefton & van de Ven (2009) 's study on the relation between means-tested bene…ts and taxation to a richer modeling environment so that we can quantify the optimal income tax rates as in Conesa et al. (2009) for the UK.
In means tested pension programs, the retirement bene…t function depends on individual income at the time the bene…ts are paid. This dependence is assumed to be linear, with 1 Gervais (2012) shows that a progressive tax on labor income can also be used to mimic an optimal agedependent tax policy.
2 As in Conesa et al. (2009) , we ignore the transitional dynamics; use lognormal distributions of earnings shocks; and ignore the female labor supply decisions. In a recent paper Fehr & Kindermann (2015) show that incorporating transitional dynamics generate much lower optimal capital income tax rates. Guvenen et al. (2015) show that earnings shocks display substantial deviations from lognormality-the standard assumption in the incomplete markets. Kaygusuz (2015) show that incorporating female supply decision to tax-transfer models has also important implications. a constant negative slope (taper rate) i.e., the bene…ts are reduced by a fraction of current income. The taper cannot turn the bene…ts negative. This introduces non-linearity. Since dissaving is a source of income later in the life cycle, the taper can act as a non-linear tax on savings.
We start with a benchmark model in which the taper rate is 100% and the income tax system (baseline tax system) mimics that of the UK and calibrate the model economy to the UK data. Keeping everything else constant, we calculate the optimal tax system in this economy. Later we reduce the taper rate to 40% keeping the baseline tax system intact and calculate the associated optimal tax system. Since the UK reformed the means-tested pension program by reducing the taper rate from 100% to 40% in 2003, we call the former the pre-reform taper rate and the latter the post-reform rate. We repeat our analysis assuming a zero taper (universal pension program) and the complete removal of the means-tested pension program as well.
We …nd that the optimal capital income tax rates in both pre-and post-reform economies in the UK are signi…cantly positive at 33% and 34% respectively. Furthermore, we show that the optimal capital income tax rate is 37% and 31% in the universal pension and the complete removal settings, respectively. The complete removal setting is the closest to that of Conesa et al. (2009) . From here we can see that having means-tested and universal pension programs put upward pressure on the optimal capital income tax rate since they increase the government's revenue requirement.
More importantly, we show that there is a negative relation between taper rates and the optimal capital income tax rate. The taper rate substitutes for the proportional capital tax: lower taper rates lead the planner to pick higher capital tax rates; higher taper rates reduce the need for linear capital taxes and the planner picks lower rates. The intuition is as follows: First, a lower taper rate implies a higher revenue requirement (revenue e¤ect). The revenue e¤ect is a mechanical reduction in the revenue needed to be raised when the taper is higher. The higher revenue requirement leads to higher capital and labor tax rates. Second, the means-tested pension program acts as a non-linear capital income tax by only targeting the individuals over the retirement age and reduces the need for the linear tax (substitution e¤ ect). Thus, when the taper rate is higher, the optimal capital income tax rate becomes relatively lower. Third, as in Peterman (2013a) , the optimal tax on capital increases when the size of the meanstested pension program increases as a result of a decrease in the taper rate (pension bene…t e¤ ect). Revenue and pension bene…t e¤ects are somehow related. Lower taper rates imply that more individuals receive more generous means-tested bene…ts. Hence, the government needs to increase taxes on capital and labor incomes to ful…ll its revenue requirement. Since retired individuals now get higher bene…ts, the government would prefer to tax capital income more to unwind some of generous retirement bene…ts.
Interestingly, when the taper rate is 100%, the welfare improvement as a result of changing the tax system from the baseline to the optimal one is the lowest among all the settings we considered. This result further highlights the role of a means-tested pension program as an e¤ective way of targeting capital income. It has also been shown that a similar pattern of life-cycle asset holdings can be generated by either reforming the baseline tax system or changing the taper rate. From this perspective, the existence of a means-tested pension program in the economy enhances the policy maker's options.
Our results suggest not just that positive capital income taxation may be welfare improving, but that means testing publicly …nanced retirement pensions has a similar impact. Means testing may not only reduce the revenue requirement for a given pension bene…t, but improve resource allocation and aggregate welfare. This is of special interest in light of current global debate on public pension reform and taxation.
Although social insurance bene…ts have been means-tested for a long time, these policies have only recently attracted systematic attention from economists. By using a partial equilibrium model with a binary labor-leisure choice Sefton et al. (2008) and Sefton & van de Ven (2009) analyzed the welfare implications of the means-testing of pension bene…ts and the interactions between various tax schemes and means-tested bene…ts respectively. Kumru & Piggott (2009) extend Sefton et al. (2008) 's model to analyze the implications of means-tested bene…ts in a general equilibrium framework. Both studies report that means-testing increases welfare. Golosov & Tsyvinski (2006) analyze the implications of asset (means) testing disability insurance and …nd signi…cant welfare gains from asset testing. In a recent paper, Kitao (2014) analyzes various social security reform proposals including means-testing of bene…ts and shows that means-testing might not be a good idea.
There is also a growing literature that investigates the determinants of the tax rate on capital income by extending Conesa et al. (2009) from various channels. Peterman (2013a) highlights the impact of changing two assumptions: variable Frisch elasticity of labor supply and taxing accidental bequests at the same rate. These changes cause the optimal tax on capital to drop by almost half. Nakajima (2010) incorporates a housing asset into a model similar to that of Conesa et al. (2009) and shows that the optimal capital income tax rate in the model with housing is 1%. Kuklik (2011 ) extends Conesa et al. (2009 's model by adding two additional elements: a non-linear mapping between hours worked and wages and inter-vivos transfers and shows that the optimal capital income tax rate in the US is 7:4%. Peterman (2013b) and Peterman (2015) show that incorporating endogenous retirement decision and learning by doing also cause increases in optimal capital tax rates. Shourideh & Troshkin (2012) follow the empirically driven Mirrleesian literature and provide an analysis of pension system as an integral part of the overall income tax code. Although we use a di¤erent methodology, our study is related to that of Shourideh & Troshkin (2012) in terms of analyzing the pension system and the income tax code together. Incorporating the transition path from the status quo to the reformed steady state can also matter for the optimal capital tax rate. Fehr & Kindermann (2015) show that the optimal capital tax rate is signi…cantly lower when transitional cohorts explicitly taken into account. All these …ndings suggest that many di¤erent factors would a¤ect the optimal capital income tax rate. There is also a line of study that extends Conesa et al. (2009) by analyzing the various income tax reforms: Kitao (2010) studies the implications of the reform proposal that replaces the current US income tax system with a system that includes a labor-dependent capital income tax and shows that the reform proposal creates a signi…cant welfare gain. Fukushima (2010) studies the implications of a policy reform which replaces an optimal ‡at tax with an optimal nonlinear tax that is age and history dependent and shows that welfare increases substantially.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In sections 2 and 3, we present the model economy and the calibration process, respectively. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 concludes. The details of numerical analysis and the remaining …gures are reported in the Appendix.
The Model Economy
We use a general equilibrium OLG model economy with uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and mortality. The main features of our model follow those of Conesa et al. (2009) . Our model di¤ers from that of Conesa et al. (2009) from two directions. First, the model incorporates a means-tested pension program. Second, our model economy is calibrated to the UK. In terms of modeling the public sector, we follow Sefton et al. (2008) and Sefton & van de Ven (2009) .
Demographics
Time is discrete. Each period a new generation is born. Individuals live a maximum of J periods. The population grows at a constant rate n. All individuals face a probability (s j ) of surviving from age j to j + 1 conditional on surviving up to age j. Individuals retire at exogenously determined retirement age j and receive relevant pension bene…ts.
Endowments
Let j 2Ĵ = f1; 2; :::Jg denote age. An individual's labor productivity in a given period depends on age, permanent di¤erences in productivity due to di¤erences in education or abilities, and an idiosyncratic productivity shock to the individual's labor productivity. In other words, agents are heterogenous in terms of labor productivity. Age-dependent labor productivity is denoted by e j . Each individual is born with a permanent ability typeê i 2Ê = fê 1 ;ê 2 ; :::;ê m g with probability p i > 0. Individuals face an idiosyncratic shock 2 = f 1 ; 2 ; :::; n g to labor productivity. The stochastic process for is identical and independent across individuals and follows a …nite-state Markov process with a stationary distribution over time: Q( ; ) = Pr( 0 2 j ). We assume that Q consists of only strictly positive entries and hence, is the unique, strictly positive, invariant distribution associated with Q. Initially each individual has the same average stochastic productivity given by = P ( ); where ( ) is the probability of . Hence, an ability typeê i individual's labor supply at age j in terms of e¢ ciency units are written as e jêi l j , where l j is hours of work. Let a 2 A R + , where a denotes asset holdings.
A is a compact set. Its upper bound never binds and its lower bound is equal to zero. We de…ne the space of individuals'state variables as follows: X =Ĵ A Ê : Note that at any time t, an individual is characterized by the state set x = (j; a;ê i ; ) 2 X. Let M be the Borel -algebra generated by X and let B 2 M: De…ne as the probability measure over M: Hence, we can represent individuals'type distribution by the probability space (X; M; ).
Preferences
Individuals have preferences over consumption and leisure sequence fc j ; (1 l j )g J j=1 represented by a standard time separable utility function:
where E is the expectation operator and is the time-discount factor. Expectations are taken over the stochastic processes that govern idiosyncratic labor productivity risk and longevity.
Technology
A representative …rm produces output Y at time t by using aggregate labor input measured in e¢ ciency units (L) and aggregate capital stock (K). The technology is represented by a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale production function:
A t is the level of total factor productivity. Output shares of capital stock and labor input are given by and (1 ) respectively. The capital stock depreciates at a constant rate 2 (0; 1). The representative …rm maximizes its pro…t by setting wage and rental rates equal to the marginal products of labor and capital respectively:
The Public Sector
The government runs a public pension system comprising an earnings-dependent Pay As You Go (PAYG) pension and a means-tested pension programs. Since individuals face stochastic life-span and private annuity markets are closed by assumption, a fraction of the population will leave accidental bequests. The government con…scates all accidental bequests and delivers them to the remaining population in a lump-sum manner. We denote these transfers by t . Finally, the government faces a sequence of exogenously given consumption expenditures fG t g 1 t=1 . To …nance its consumption and means-tested pension program expenditures, the government levies taxes on capital income, labor income, and consumption. PAYG pension program is self…nancing and bene…ts are …nanced through payroll tax ( p ) collections.
A j year old individual's labor income, capital income, and gross taxable income in year t are given as follows: y l;t = w t e jêi l j ; y k;;t = r t (a t + t );
The pension program of our model re ‡ects the basic features of that of the UK. 3 Individuals who reach retirement age receive a PAYG pension bene…t b t (x) at time t and might be entitled to additional means-tested pension bene…ts depending on their private income. 4 The PAYG program bene…ts are calculated as follows:
where y l;j is an individual's labor income at age j and is the PAYG replacement rate. Means-tested bene…ts are determined as follows:
where b t (x) is the means-tested bene…t received by a retired individual at time t; b t is the maximum amount of means-tested pension bene…ts that can be received at time t; and is the taper (bene…t reduction) rate. Following Conesa et al. (2009) and Nakajima (2010) we use the functional form introduced by Gouveia & Strauss (1994) to capture the progressivity of the income tax rate in our baseline economies:
where 0 , 1 , and 2 are parameters. In this speci…cation, while the level of average tax 3 The UK pension system consists of three tiers: The universal ‡at rate Basic State Pension (BSP), mandatory second tier [individuals must either pay contributions to the state run PAYG earnings related scheme (State Second Pension) or pay contributions into a privately funded scheme], and means-tested bene…ts. Our model is a simpli…ed version of the UK system. The …rst tier is the earnings-related PAYG system which incorporates the UK's …rst and second tier bene…ts and the second tier is the means-tested pension program that mimics the UK's means-tested pension program. See Sefton et al. (2008) for a detailed exposition of the UK public pension program. 4 In our model individuals can receive the means-tested bene…ts only after they reach the exogenously determined retirement age (equivalent to the state pension age). However, in the UK, individuals might be entitled to means-tested bene…ts before they reach the state pension age. The actual means-tested bene…ts are also subject to asset tests. Individuals receive the minimum bene…ts determined by asset and income tests. Notice that in the model, after retirement individuals do not work. Thus, retirement income comes from two major sources: asset holdings and the …rst tier PAYG pension bene…ts. This implies that the income test is tighter then the asset test since the test base is wider in the former i.e. it always generates lower bene…ts than the asset test in our environment. rate is controlled by 0 , the progressivity of the tax code is controlled by 1 and 2 . This functional form has been extensively employed in the quantitative public …nance literature. See for example, Castañeda et al. (1998) , Rull (1999) , and Conesa & Krueger (2006) . 5 In our calculation of the optimal tax rates, we assume that the capital income tax rate is proportional and denoted by k and the labor income tax rate is determined by the same Gouveia-Strauss tax function as follows:
In addition to taxes on capital and labor incomes, the government taxes consumption expenditures at an exogenously given proportional rate c , which does not change in all experiments.
An Individual' s Decision Problem
In the baseline (status quo), individuals face the following budget constraint:
In the optimal system, individuals face the following budget constraint:
where the next period's variables are denoted by a prime. For instance, a 0 denotes the next period's asset holdings. Individuals also face the following borrowing constraint:
The decision problem of an individual in our model economy can be written as a dynamic programming problem. Denoting the value function of the individual at time t by V t , the decision problem is represented by the following problem: 5 Gouveia-Strauss tax function comprises an array of progressive, proportional, and regressive tax schedules:
The limiting values of marginal and average tax rates are equal to 0 (limy!1 T (y) y = limy!1 T 0 (y) = 0); when 1 = 1; the amount of tax paid does not depend on income (T (y) = 0 1); when 1 ! 0; the tax system is propostional (T (y) = 0y); and when 1 > 1, the tax system is progressive since aveage and marginal taxes are strictly increasing function of income (
subject to the aforementioned budget and borrowing constraints.
Equilibrium
Our competitive and stationary competitive equilibrium de…nition follows Auerbach & Kotliko¤ (1987) , Conesa et al. (2009), and Nakajima (2010) .
De…nition 1 Given sequences of government expenditures fG t g 1 t=1 ; consumption tax rates ft c g 1 t=1 ; payroll tax rate f p g 1 t=1 , maximum amount of means-tested bene…ts can be received fb t g 1 t=1 ; taper rate f g 1 t=1 and initial conditions K 1 and 1 ; a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of value functions fV t g 1 t=1 and optimal decision rules fc t ; a 0 t ; l t g 1 t=1 ; measures f t g 1 t=1 ; aggregate stock of capital and aggregate labor supply fK t ; L t g 1 t=1 ; prices fr t ; w t g 1 t=1 ; transfers f t g 1 t=1 ; and tax policies f k;t ; T t (:)g 1 t=1 such that 1. fV t g 1 t=1 is a solution to the maximization problem de…ned above by 12. Associated optimal decision rules are given by the sequence fc t ; a 0 t ; l t g 1 t=1 :
2. The representative …rm maximizes its pro…t according to the equations 3 and 4.
3. All markets clear:
where
6. PAYG pension program is self …nancing: p;t R y l;t t (f1; :::; j 1g da dê i d ) = R b t (j; a;ê i ; ) t (fj ; :::; Jg da dê i d ):
7. Means-tested pension payments are given by
8. Government runs a balanced budget:
De…nition 2 A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which per capita variables and functions, prices, and policies are constant. Aggregate variables grow at the constant rate n.
Calibration
This section de…nes the parameter values of our model. The values of calibrated parameters for the benchmark economy are presented in Table 1 .
Demographics Each model period corresponds to a year. Individuals are born at a real age of 20 (model age of 1) and they can live up to a maximum real life age of 100 (model age of 81). The population growth rate is assumed to be equal to the long-term average growth rate of the UK's population i.e. n = 0:5% [National Statistics (2009a)]. 6 The sequence of conditional survival probabilities in the model, s j is set equal to the sequence of conditional survival probabilities of men in the UK using 2002 2004 data [National Statistics (2009b) ]. The mandatory retirement age is 65 (model age of 46), which is equal to the UK's state pension access age for men.
Endowments An individual's wage income at time t, expressed in logarithms is given by log(w t ) + log( e j ) + log(ê i ) + log( ). The age dependent e¢ ciency index, e j is set as follows: Robinson (2003) estimates age-earnings pro…les for di¤erent educational levels by using various speci…cations. We take her estimates of weekly earnings for di¤erent levels of experience, normalize the data by setting the value of weekly earnings for a man with one year's experience to 1 and interpolate the normalized data by using the spline method for missing values. 7 There are two ability types:ê 1 = e ê andê 2 = e ê , where E(log(ê i )) = 0, var(log(ê i )) = 2 e , and the population mass, p i = 1=2. The stochastic component of the idiosyncratic part of wages follows the AR(1) process, log( 0 ) = log( )+ ; where N (0; 2 ): AR(1) process is approximated by using a …nite-state …rst order Markov process with seven states. Blundell & Etheridge (2008) Preferences Individuals have time-separable preferences over consumption and leisure. We use the following standard Cobb-Douglas speci…cation:
The value of determines the importance of consumption relative to leisure and the value of determines the level of risk aversion. Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption (IES) is equal to 1 1+
: We set = 4 and pin down = 0:377 by setting IES=0:5; which is commonly accepted value for IES in the literature. By setting = 0:377 we make sure that average hours worked is 1=3 of the disposable time endowment. 8 We set time-discount factor = 0:965 in the benchmark model to generate the capital-output ratio of approximately 2:8. 9
Technology Batini et al. (2000) report the values of labor's share of income (1 ) in the UK between 1970 and 1995. The values ‡uctuate between 68% and 74% and their average is approximately 70%. Hence, we set the value of labor income share to 0:70. Weale (2004) estimates the capital depreciation rate in the UK in 2002 to be 4:82%. We use the same value for . The technology level, A can be chosen freely and we set it to 1: Government Policy We set the value of the maximum amount of means-tested bene…ts that can be received, b to 5% of output per capita in the model. This bene…t is reduced by a taper rate applied to any private income including PAYG pension bene…ts. We variously set the value of the taper rate, to 100%; 40%; and 0% in our analysis. We set government expenditure G to 22% of GDP.
We estimate the parameters of the Gouveia-Strauss tax function by using UK income tax data as ( 0 ; 1; 2 ) = (:521; :701; :317). The details of the estimation are given in Appendix. In our baseline calibrations, we set the income tax function's parameters' 0 and 1 equal to our estimated values where 2 is determined endogenously by the budget balance condition i.e. the parameter 2 adjusts to ensure that the government's budget is balanced. In our search for the optimal tax system we set the values of the labor income tax function's parameters 1 and 2 equal to those of the baseline's income tax function (i.e. we keep the level of progressivity constant) with 0 determined endogenously. We set the consumption tax rate c to 5%.
Results

Computational Experiment and Welfare Measures
In our experiments, as in Conesa et al. (2009) and Nakajima (2010) , the government optimizes over the two tax functions given by equation 8. More precisely, the government maximizes 8 The Frisch Elasticity=
; which is equal to 1 under our parameter value choices. 9 Doblin (1991) estimates the long-run capital-output ratio for the UK as 2:8. 
It is important to note that the tax reform is revenue neutral i.e. the total tax revenue required to be raised in order to …nance government expenditures is the same across optimal and baseline tax cases.
In order to compare welfare across economies with di¤erent tax programs, following Conesa et al. (2009) , we compute the consumption equivalent variation (CEV) which is simply the uniform percentage decrease in consumption required to make an agent indi¤erent between being born under the optimal tax program (comparison case) relative to being born under the status quo tax system (baseline case). A positive CEV re ‡ects a welfare increase due to the optimal tax program compared to the baseline case. 11 Our CEV measure can be decomposed into two components: one part that captures the changes in CEV due to changes in consumption from c 0 to c and the other part captures the changes in leisure from (1 l 0 ) to (1 l ). Each component then can be divided further to capture changes in average consumption (leisure) and distribution of consumption (leisure). In other words, CEV CEV C + CEV L ; where CEV C and CEV L denote the changes in CEV due to consumption and leisure respectively. CEV C CEV CL +CEV CD and CEV L CEV LL +CEV LD ; where CEV CL and CEV LL denote changes in CEV due to changes in the level of consumption and leisure respectively and CEV CD and CEV LD denote changes in CEV due to changes in the distribution of consumption and leisure respectively. It can be shown that CEV CL = (C =C 0 ) 1 and CEV LL = (L =L 0 ) 1 , where C and L stand for aggregate amounts of consumption and leisure. 12 In our benchmark economy, we set the taper rate to 100%, which is the pre-reform rate in 2003 in the UK, and calculate total taxes paid by using the baseline tax function. Then we calculate the optimal tax rates for this economy. To explore the implications of a means-tested pension program with capital income taxation, we vary the taper rate by keeping the baseline tax function constant and calculate the optimal tax rates for those economies as well.
Benchmark Model
First we describe the features of the benchmark economy and the implications of the optimal tax program in this economy. In the baseline case, the income tax system is characterized by ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 )=(0:521; 0:701; 0:819) which re ‡ects the progressive income tax system in the UK implying the income tax system with marginal rate of 52:1% and a and a deduction of $17396 relative to the average income of $26970. In contrast, the optimal tax system is 33% tax rate on capital income ( k ) and a labor income tax characterized by ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 )=(0:454; 0:701; 0:819) implying the labor income tax is a ‡at tax with marginal rate of 45:4% and a deduction of $17396 relative to the average income of $26970. As in Conesa et al. (2009) and Nakajima (2010) , the signi…cantly positive tax on capital income maximizes welfare. 13 The intuition behind taxing capital income with a signi…cantly higher rate is as follows: When the Frisch elasticity varies over the life-cycle, it is optimal to condition labor income taxes on ages. When age-based taxation is not feasible, the positive tax on capital can be used to mimic the optimal age based taxation. This is because a tax on capital income implicitly taxes younger labor income at a relatively higher rate. In addition, the inability to tax accidental bequests is another substantial reason for higher capital income tax rates in Conesa et al. (2009) and in this paper (see Peterman (2013a) for a detailed discussion in these issues). Table 2 : Economic aggregates and social welfare in status-quo (baseline) and optimal tax system economies when the taper rate is 100% Table 2 presents equilibrium statistics of the baseline and optimal tax systems and welfare consequences of switching from the baseline tax system to the optimal one. As a consequence of switching from the baseline to the optimal system, all economic aggregates increase signi…cantly. The optimal system's positive e¤ects on saving and labor supply decisions are re ‡ected in higher aggregate output and consumption levels. In our benchmark economy, the highest marginal tax rate is 52:1%. In the optimal system, the taxes on capital income and labor income are lighter relative to the benchmark economy. This, in turn causes an increase in capital and labor supply. Total welfare gain is equivalent to 1:34% increase in consumption at all ages and all states of the world. This value is quite close to the one calculated by Conesa et al. (2009) . The e¤ects of the optimal system on aggregate labor supply and capital stock di¤er from those documented in Conesa et al. (2009) and Nakajima (2010) . In a similar vein, the sources of welfare gain in our model is di¤erent from those of Conesa et al. (2009) and Nakajima (2010) .
In Conesa et al. (2009) , in the optimal tax system capital drops substantially below the level of the benchmark economy. Consequently aggregate output and aggregate consumption fall as well. This is an immediate consequence of the heavy tax on capital income in the optimal tax system, relative to the benchmark (where the highest marginal tax rate is 25.8 percent). The change in taxes also induces adjustments in labor supply. While average hours worked drop by 0.56 percent, labor e¢ ciency units drop by only 0.11 percent; thus labor supply shifts from less to more productive households. In Nakajima (2010) , when the capital income tax rate is lowered from the baseline level of 40% to the optimal level of 31%, the average labor income tax rate has to be increased to guarantee the revenue neutrality. Naturally, capital stock increases, by 2.3%, while labor supply declines by 1.5%. Aggregate output and aggregate consumption decline, by 0.5% and 1.3%, respectively.
In Conesa et al. (2009) , the improvement in the life-cycle distribution of the consumption and the increase in the level of the amount of leisure taken are the main driving forces behind the total increase in welfare despite the fact that the level of consumption decreases substantially. In Nakajima (2010), the total welfare gain is equivalent to a mere 0.1% increase in consumption in each period. Although the aggregate e¤ect is negative, re ‡ecting the decline in aggregate consumption, the positive redistribution e¤ect more than o¤sets the negative aggregate e¤ect. The overall size of the welfare gain by moving from the baseline economy to the one with the optimal tax rate is small, because the baseline economy with a 40% capital income tax rate is close to the economy with the optimal capital income tax rate. In our model, however, the main source of welfare improvement is increased level of consumption. Improvements in the distribution of consumption and leisure play a minor positive role while the decrease in leisure consumption creates a substantial negative e¤ect on welfare.
Figure 1: Life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings, labor supply, consumption, and taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies when the taper rate is 100%
In Figure 1 we document the life-cycle pro…les of the average individual type in the baseline and optimal tax system economies when the taper rate is set at 100%: The life-cycle pro…les of di¤erent productivity types are given in the Appendix, Figure A3 . Figure 1(a) shows the average asset holdings (the relevant tax base for the capital income tax) by age. As in earlier studies, life-cycle asset holdings are hump-shaped and individuals aged 40 to 70 bear the main burden of the capital income tax. The positive e¤ect of the optimal tax system on asset holdings can be easily seen in the …gure: At younger ages (approximately from age 20 to age 40) asset holdings are almost identical in both systems; life-cycle asset holdings in the optimal system exceed that of the base line during middle age (approximately from age 40 to 70); and the life-cycle asset holdings in the baseline system are slightly higher at old ages (approximately from age 70 to 100). This in turn re ‡ects a signi…cantly higher capital stock in the optimal system. While in Conesa et al. (2009) life-cycle asset holdings in the optimal system lie below that of the baseline, in Nakajima (2010) life-cycle asset holdings in baseline and optimal cases follow a similar path to those of Figure 1(a) . The optimal tax system in our model mitigates some of the burden from the shoulders of the middle aged individuals and hence, this group's asset holdings increase.
Figure 1(b) demonstrates the average life-cycle pattern of hours worked. Labor supply increases in the early 20s up to the early 30s and declines after that until retirement age independently of the tax regime. Individuals prefer to postpone leisure to old age as a consequence of a higher time discount rate and positive after tax return on asset holdings. As it is clear from the …gure, the optimal tax system results in a higher labor supply at almost all ages. This result is in contrast with that of Conesa et al. (2009) who …nd the optimal system induces individuals to work more at more productive ages.
Figure 1(c) documents the empirically plausible hump-shaped life-cycle consumption pro…les for both tax systems. It also documents a discrete fall in consumption at the beginning of retirement as a result of non-separability of consumption and leisure in the utility function. As it is clear from the …gure, the optimal tax system increases the level of consumption at all ages without changing the pattern much. In contrast, in Conesa et al. (2009) , the optimal tax system smooths the distribution but decreases the level especially after retirement.
Figure 1(d) depicts the life-cycle pro…les of taxes paid. Note that in the optimal system, we are able to separate the amount of taxes paid from capital and labor incomes. The life-cycle pro…le of tax payments tilts towards the aged in the optimal system. In the baseline case, until retirement, individuals pay more taxes. After retirement, the amount of taxes paid at each age is lower than that of the optimal tax system, which prescribes a heavier tax on capital income. Figure A3 shows the life-cycle pro…les for low (type 1) and high (type 2) ability types. From the …gure we see that the optimal capital income tax system implies slightly lower asset holdings over the life-cycle for low ability types. In contrast, it positively a¤ects high ability types' life-cycle asset holdings. In the status-quo economy, the highest marginal tax rate is 52.1%. Only high ability type individuals would face these higher rates. In the optimal system, the capital income tax rate is 34%, which is substantially lower than the marginal income tax rate in the status quo economy. As a result, high ability type individuals increase their asset holdings substantially since they receive higher after-tax return from their savings. In the benchmark economy, on the other hand, there are generous deductions for low ability type individuals. Hence, 34% tax on capital income in the optimal economy does not bring much bene…t to them. Both low and high ability type individuals increase their labor supplies since they face lower marginal tax rates while the deductions are the same as in the benchmark.
The low ability type's life-cycle distribution of consumption slightly increases at every age due to an increase in labor supply. In contrast, we see a higher increase in the high ability types'life cycle consumption since the optimal system leads to a higher saving and labor supply. Figure A3 (d) reveals that while the low ability type's taxes after retirement increases only slightly in the optimal case, the high ability type's taxes after retirement increases signi…cantly.
In our model we assume away from the endogenous retirement decision. Peterman (2013b) demonstrates that the optimal capital income tax rate increases when endogenous retirement decision is taken into consideration. It seems possible that endogenous retirement could alter the relationship between the optimal tax system and the retirement program. In order to check that whether the model could be interpreted as a reduced form model capturing some of the e¤ects of endogenous retirement, we calculate the Frisch elasticity pro…le for each case we considered (see …gure A7 for example). 14 Our plots show that the average Frisch labor supply elasticity increases with age which is consistent with an increasing Frisch elasticity around the age that agents are considering retirement. This in turn implies that endogenous retirement may not have a large e¤ect in our model environment. Hence, our exogenous retirement assumption seems plausible.
E¤ects of Means Testing
We now explore the interaction between means testing retirement income and the capital income tax. Our computational strategy is the same as above except we set the taper rate to the postreform rate of 40% now. In the baseline case the income tax system is characterized by ( 0 ; 1 ;
2 )=(0:521; 0:701; 0:905). Notice that in the baseline economies 2 is determined endogenously. As a natural consequence of this, 2 across the two baseline economies slightly di¤er but this small di¤erence a¤ects the progressivity of the tax system minimally. The optimal tax system in this setting is 34% tax rate on capital income ( k ) and a labor income tax characterized by ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 )=(0:457; 0:701; 0:905) implying the labor income tax is a ‡at tax with marginal rate of 45:7% and a deduction of $16698 relative to the average income of $26970.
A comparison of optimal tax systems across the two settings reveals that when the taper rate is low, a slightly higher capital income tax rate maximizes welfare. There are three reasons: First, a lower taper rate causes an increase in the government's revenue requirement (revenue e¤ ect). This additional revenue can be …nanced by an increase in labor income and/or capital income tax rates. Our results show that the additional revenue requirement is optimally …nanced by an increase in both labor and capital income tax rates. Second, one can interpret means-testing of retirement income as a form of non-linear capital income tax since it reduces the e¤ective return of private retirement savings for people who are eligible for bene…ts relative 1 4 Since all other …gures are pretty similar we only provide the Frisch labor supply elasticity pro…le for the benchmark economy to save space. The Frisch labor supply elasticity pro…le is given by to those who are not (substitution e¤ ect). When the taper rate is reduced, the e¤ective tax on capital income decreases. This in turn implies a higher optimal capital income tax rate as well. Third, the optimal tax on capital increases when the size of the means-tested pension program increases as a result of a decrease in the taper rate (pension bene…t e¤ ect). Revenue and pension bene…t e¤ects are somehow related. Lower taper rates imply that more individuals receive more generous means-tested bene…ts. Hence, the government needs to increase taxes on capital and labor incomes to ful…ll its revenue requirement. Since retired individuals now get higher bene…ts, the government would prefer to tax capital income more to unwind some of generous retirement bene…ts. Table 3 presents equilibrium statistics of the baseline and optimal tax systems and welfare consequences of switching from the baseline tax system to the optimal one. Similar to the benchmark case all economic aggregates grow. Yet, the growth rates of economic aggregates are larger in this setting. This implies that when the taper rate is low, switching from the baseline tax system to the optimal tax system creates a larger improvement in economic aggregates. We see a similar trend in the welfare measure as well. In an economy with a lower taper rate, the optimal tax system increases welfare relatively more. The intuition is as follows. When the taper rate is high, the e¤ective tax on capital income is relatively closer to its optimal value but when the taper rate is low the e¤ective tax on capital income is relatively far away from the optimal value. Hence, the optimal tax system prescribes a higher capital income tax rate and improves welfare more when the taper rate is low. This result is important in the following sense. When the taper rate is low, the need for switching the tax system from the baseline to the optimal one is quite crucial. Yet, when the taper rate is high, the need for reform in the tax system is relatively less crucial.
Figure 2: Life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings, labor supply, consumption, and taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies when the taper rate is 40% Figure 2 documents the life-cycle pro…les of the average individual type in the baseline and optimal tax system economies when the taper rate is 40%: We report the life-cycle pro…les of di¤erent productivity types in the Appendix, Figure A4 . A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 reveals that the optimal tax systems in the two settings create similar distributional e¤ects on the life-cycle pro…les. Low and high ability types' life-cycle pro…les also do not much di¤er across two settings. Now we go further and reduce the taper to zero. This is equivalent to a universal pension program since all individuals receive the bene…ts without any reduction. In the baseline case the income tax system is characterized by ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 )=(0:521; 0:701; 1:427). The optimal tax system in this case is a 37% tax rate on capital income ( k ) and a labor income tax characterized by ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 )=(0:465; 0:701; 1:427) implying the labor income tax is a ‡at tax with marginal rate of 46:5% and a deduction of $13318 relative to the average income of $26970. Our aforementioned claims regarding the relationship between means-testing and the optimal capital income tax rate is further strengthened here: When the taper rate is low, the optimal capital income tax rate is relatively higher. Zero taper rate means a form of non-linear tax on capital income at older ages is absent. Hence, the capital income tax must be higher to allow the overall e¤ective tax on capital income to reach its optimal value, in addition to the higher revenue …nancing requirements. Table 4 : Economic aggregates and social welfare in status-quo (baseline) and optimal tax system economies when the taper rate is 0% Table 4 presents equilibrium statistics of the baseline and optimal tax systems and welfare consequences of switching from the baseline tax system to the optimal one. A zero taper rate speci…cation implies an overall e¤ective tax structure with no separate capital taxation, so the potential for welfare improvement from the optimal capital tax system is much greater. This speci…cation e¤ectively removes one capital tax instrument, so that the conventional capital income tax now carries the full weight of generating welfare and aggregate improvements. Similar to the earlier settings all economic aggregates grow, but the rates of growth are signi…cantly larger in this setting. We see a similar trend in the welfare measure as well. Welfare improvement is much higher than the previous settings. The signi…cant level e¤ect is also re ‡ected in CEV CL measure which is signi…cantly higher than the previous ones. Figures A1 and A5 in Appendix report the …gures of life-cycle pro…les for average type and low and high ability types respectively. The pattern of life-cycle pro…les do not di¤er much from those of the previous settings.
Our results in this setting have an important policy implication: In an economy with an universal pension program …nanced through the general budget, reforming the tax system can generate a substantial welfare improvement. taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies when the taper rates are 100% and 0% Figure 3 presents the life-cycle pro…les of the settings with zero and 100% taper rates in the baseline and optimal tax systems. The overall e¤ective tax systems di¤er between the two settings, because in one case, we specify an e¤ective age based capital income tax, and then choose an optimal capital tax, while in the other, no pre-existing age based tax is speci…ed. But the …gure reveals the quasi complementarity between these two cases, and the implicit partial substitutability between the means test and a capital tax. More precisely, the asset distribution in the economy with a zero taper rate and a baseline tax system can be improved by either switching from the baseline tax system to the optimal one keeping the taper rate intact, or switching from a zero taper rate to a 100% taper rate keeping the baseline tax system intact. While these policies are distinct, their quasi-complementarity is clearly demonstrated here. Flexibility in choosing a non-zero taper rate enhances the government's choice set.
Finally, we analyze the economy with no means tested pension program. Only the earningsrelated pension now exists. This implies a lower revenue requirement. In the baseline case the income tax system is characterized by ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 )=(0:521; 0:701; 0:691). The optimal tax system in this case is 31% tax rate on capital income ( k ) and a labor income tax characterized by ( 0 ; 1 ; 2 )=(0:437; 0:701; 0:691) implying the labor income tax is a ‡at tax with marginal rate of 43:7% and a deduction of $18532 relative to the average income of $26970.
This setting may be compared with our earlier speci…cations in two dimensions. In terms of revenue requirement, it is closer to the 100% taper speci…cation but in terms of the pro…le of tax rates, it is closer to the zero taper speci…cation i.e. there is only one type of tax Table 5 : Economic aggregates and social welfare in status-quo (baseline) and optimal tax system economies when the means-tested pension program is removed on capital income. Because the government's revenue requirement is relatively lower in this setting, optimal tax rates on labor and capital incomes are lower than those of the previous settings. This in turn implies that the welfare improvement from realigning taxes is less than that of the zero-taper rate setting. On the other hand, an economic setting with a higher-taper-rate means-tested pension program yields a resource allocation pattern where the potential for welfare improvement is less. More precisely, the optimal tax system generates the largest welfare improvement when the taper rate is zero, the second largest welfare improvement when there is no means tested program, the third largest welfare improvement when the taper rate is 40% and the lowest welfare improvement when the taper rate is 100%. This result is interesting in a sense that it highlights the complementarity between optimal income tax rate and taper rate once again: Although the existence of a means-tested pension program increases the government's revenue requirement and puts upward pressure on both optimal capital and labor income tax rates, its positive e¤ect on life-cycle asset holdings signi…cantly reduces the potential welfare gains from the tax reform.
Figures A2 and A6 in the Appendix report the life-cycle pro…les for average type individuals and low and high ability types, respectively. The pattern of life-cycle pro…les do not di¤er much from those of the earlier settings.
As we mentioned earlier our results reveal three e¤ects: revenue, substitution, and pension bene…t. In order to isolate these e¤ects we conduct two counter-factuals. In the …rst counter- Table 6 : Tax rates factual, we increased the maximum amount of means-tested pension bene…ts (b t ) by setting it to 10% of output per capita. We call this counter-factual as "higher bene…t model." In the second counter-factual, we assume that no revenue is required to …nance means-tested pension programs. In this exercise b t did not change. We call this counter-factual as "no revenue model." Table 6 shows the tax rates in main, higher bene…t and no revenue models.
First we analyze what would happen if we increase b t for a given taper rate by comparing the main model with the higher bene…t model. Since the taper rate is kept constant, the substitution e¤ect has no role in this exercise. When we increase b t , we observe optimal capital tax rates in the higher bene…t model is much larger than those in the main model for each taper rate. When taper rate is 100%, increasing b t caused a 15% increase in the capital income tax rate. When taper rate is 40%, increasing b t caused a 20% increase in the capital income tax rate. These results demonstrate that both revenue and pension bene…t e¤ects are quite signi…cant. The intuition for the revenue e¤ect is straightforward. Higher pension bene…ts require higher revenue to …nance those bene…ts for each taper rate and hence, tax on capital income increases. The intuition for pension bene…t e¤ect is as follows: The social planner chooses a lower capital tax when pension bene…ts are smaller. This way the social planner can replace some of the lower post retirement income from smaller pension bene…ts by increasing the annual after-tax return on savings by lowering tax on capital income. Table 8 shows the changes in aggregate economies and welfare across status quo and optimal economies when b t is increased. 15 Second, we analyze what would happen if we ignore the revenue requirements by comparing the main model with the no revenue model. Optimal capital income tax rates become substantially lower for all taper rates we considered. Since b t are kept at the same rate across two models, pension bene…t and substitution e¤ects have no roles in this comparison. When the taper rate is 40%, the optimal capital income tax rate decreases by 82:35% if remove the revenue requirement. Similarly, when the taper rate is 0%, the optimal capital income tax rate decreases by 78:38%. Thus, we can claim that the revenue e¤ect is quite signi…cant and play an important role to determine how high the optimal capital tax rate will be.
Third, we analyze the role of the substitution e¤ect by comparing the optimal capital income tax rates for each taper rate in the no revenue e¤ect model. In this comparison, the revenue e¤ect has no role. The pension bene…t e¤ect would have a role since lower taper rates imply generous pension bene…ts. When we increase the taper rate from 0% to 40%, the optimal capital income tax rate decreases by 33:33%: Similarly, when we increase the taper rate from 40% to 100%, the optimal capital income tax rate decreases by 100%: Intuition is as follows: Increasing the taper rate, decreases the need for capital income tax rate since the higher taper rates act as a non-linear tax on after retirement income and substitutes capital income tax (substitution e¤ect). When we increase the taper rate, we decrease both the number of individuals who receive means-tested bene…ts and the amount of pension bene…t entitlements. Hence, the social planner chooses a lower capital tax when pension bene…ts are smaller (pension bene…t e¤ect). In sum, all three e¤ects play a signi…cant role in determining how big the optimal capital tax rate would be. Table 9 displays the changes in aggregate economies and welfare across status quo and optimal economies when bene…ts are increased. 16 In a di¤erent model setting, Sefton & van de Ven (2009) analyze the implications of various tax reforms in the presence of means-testing without searching for the optimal tax system. Our analysis di¤ers not only form the modelling perspective as explained earlier, but also di¤ers in solving for the optimal tax system a lá Conesa et al. (2009) and establishing the degree of complementarity between the capital income tax and means-testing.
Our paper is also related with the recent literature that extends Conesa et al. (2009) in various directions to investigate the determinants of the higher optimal capital income tax rate. Peterman (2013a) highlights the impact of changing two assumptions: variable Frisch elasticity of labor supply and taxing accidental bequests at the same rate. These changes cause the optimal tax on capital to drop by almost half. Nakajima (2010) incorporates a housing asset into a model similar to that of Conesa et al. (2009) and shows that the optimal capital income tax rate in the model with housing is 1%. Kuklik (2011) extends Conesa et al. (2009) 's model by adding two additional elements: a non-linear mapping between hours worked and wages and inter-vivos transfers and shows that the optimal capital income tax rate in the US is 7:4%. Peterman (2013b) and Peterman (2015) show that incorporating endogenous retirement decision and learning by doing also cause increases in optimal capital tax rates. Incorporating the transition path from the status quo to the reformed steady state can also matter for the optimal capital tax rate. Fehr & Kindermann (2015) show that the optimal capital tax rate is signi…cantly lower when transitional cohorts explicitly taken into account. Our model, although it is not calibrated to the US economy, shares many common features with that of Conesa et al. In particular, our setting with no-means-tested pension program is quite similar to their benchmark model. Our results demonstrate another channel that a¤ects optimal capital income tax rates: a social insurance program that is …nanced from the general budget.
Finally, our results suggest not just that positive capital income taxation may be welfare improving, but that means testing publicly …nanced retirement pensions has a similar impact. Means testing may not only reduce the revenue requirement for a given pension bene…t, but improve resource allocation and aggregate welfare. This is of special interest in light of current global debate on public pension reform and taxation.
Conclusion
In this paper we study the interaction between capital income taxation and means tested retirement transfer in the context of an overlapping generations model, calibrated to the UK economy. Recent literature has suggested a rehabilitation of capital income taxation (Conesa et al. (2009) ), predicated on the idea that tax on capital income would be a partial substitute for the optimal age-based taxes when they are infeasible. This leads naturally to the conjecture that a publicly funded age pension contingent upon holdings of capital or capital income may have a similar e¤ect.
We extend Conesa et al. (2009) 's canonical framework by explicitly incorporating means testing into the public retirement transfer system, so that we can analyze the interactions between means testing and capital income taxation. Within the broad framework of an incomplete market stochastic general equilibrium OLG model, calibrated to the UK economy, we specify a suite of model settings which allow us to study the impacts of alternative taper rates of the transfer system on the optimal capital and labour income tax rates. We hypothesize that because a taper rate operates as a de facto capital income tax rate on retirement assets, the optimal capital income tax rate will be lower, the higher the taper rate. Further, the taper rate directly impacts retirement assets, rather than capital as it accumulates throughout the life cycle, and this extended structure allows us to explore the implications of this age-based policy.
Our results con…rm those of recent studies suggesting that a signi…cantly positive capital income tax rate may be optimal. In our model, the largest source of welfare improvement is the increase in the level of aggregate consumption as a ‡owing from the optimal tax system.
More importantly, we show that there is a negative relation between taper rates and the optimal capital income tax rate: the higher the bene…t reduction rate, the lower the optimal capital income tax rate. The intuition is as follows: First, a higher taper rate implies a lower revenue requirement. This in turn implies lower optimal capital and labor income tax rates. Second, the means-tested pension program acts as a non-linear capital income tax by only targeting individuals over the retirement age. Thus, when the taper rate is higher, the optimal capital income tax rate becomes relatively lower. Third, the optimal tax on capital increases when the size of the retirement program increases to unwind some of generous retirement bene…ts.
Interestingly, when the taper rate is 100%, the welfare improvement as a result of changing the tax system from the baseline to the optimal one generates the lowest welfare gain among all the settings we considered. This result further highlights the role of a means-tested pension program as an e¤ective way of targeting capital income. It has also been shown that a similar pattern of life-cycle asset holdings can be generated by either reforming the baseline tax system or changing the taper rate. From this perspective, the existence of a means-tested pension program in the economy enhances the policy maker's options. Figure A0 : Average income tax rates generated by the Gouveia-Strauss tax function vs. average income tax rates calculated by using the data, which is generated by employing the information on tax rates and allowances for 2010/11 published by HM Revenue and Customs. Figure A1 : Life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings, labor supply, consumption, and taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies when the taper rate is 0% Figure A2 : Life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings, labor supply, consumption, and taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies when there is no means-tested pension program Figure A3 : Life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings, labor supply, consumption, and taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies for types 1 and 2 when the taper rate is 100% Figure A4 : Life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings, labor supply, consumption, and taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies for types 1 and 2 when the taper rate is 40% Figure A5 : Life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings, labor supply, consumption, and taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies for types 1 and 2 when the taper rate is 0% Figure A6 : Life-cycle pro…les of asset holdings, labor supply, consumption, and taxes paid in baseline and optimal tax economies for types 1 and 2 when there is no means-tested pension program Table 9 : Economic aggregates and social welfare in status-quo (baseline) and optimal tax system economies when the substitution e¤ect isolated
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